

SECRET/SENSITIVEPOLAND: POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST THE USSRI. Actions to Date

Thus far since the imposition of martial law in Poland, we have taken no concrete steps against the Soviet Union. Our diplomatic representations have been confined to Under Secretary Stoessel's December 13 meeting with Soviet Charge' Bessmertnykh, during which we handed over the text of Secretary Haig's 4:00 p.m. Brussels statement, and stressed the necessity for non-interference and a return to a process of negotiation and compromise in Poland. Stoessel also underscored our concern over the Polish situation in an informal encounter with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on December 18. In addition, at the INF negotiations Paul Nitze put the Soviets on notice that Polish developments could not but affect the future of the talks. We are presently planning a Presidential letter to Brezhnev warning against Soviet intervention and making clear we hold the Soviets responsible. Publicly, the President's December 17 statement put the Soviets on notice that we hold them responsible for the Polish crackdown, and we have placed increasing emphasis on the Soviet role in our public statements since then.

II. Possible Unilateral U.S. Actions

The following are possible actions which we could take unilaterally against the Soviets, if the Polish crisis reaches the point that we want either (1) to seek to deter the Soviets from bringing about a major escalation in repressive action against the Polish people, or (2) to impose punitive sanctions against Moscow following direct Soviet intervention. In some instances, these actions would have a substantial impact on the Soviets regardless of whether the Allies took parallel action; in other cases lack of Allied support would make their effects largely symbolic.

In considering the possible options, we should keep in mind the need to avoid a split among Western nations of the kind that occurred after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (and we can count on the Soviets to work hard to this end). At the same time, we should remember that any unilateral action could bring Soviet retaliation in kind against us.

A. Broad policy initiatives:

1. Call for an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting and, if appropriate, a meeting of the General Assembly to condemn Soviet or Soviet-sponsored repression in Poland. This could be part of a general political offensive aimed at highlighting the Soviet role in the Polish crackdown.

Pros: -- Focusing international attention on Soviet/Polish behavior could have an important deterrent effect.

Cons: -- Soviets can block UNSC action; UNGA debate could be counterproductive if it only demonstrated traditional U.N. cleavages.

State Dept. review completed

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2. Play the China Card: (a) High-visibility consultations with the Chinese; (b) sell high-technology weapons systems to Beijing

Pros: -- Signals high international costs of Soviet involvement in Poland.

Cons: -- Would touch such a raw nerve with the Soviets that it could remove the disincentives to massive Soviet intervention in Poland.

-- Chinese may attempt to extract a price with respect to Taiwan, resist political manipulation.

-- Chinese may be unable to pay for the weapons.

3. Seek to isolate the USSR economically: (a) impose total trade embargo, encompassing both agricultural and industrial exports; (b) expel all Soviet commercial representatives; (c) ban Soviet fishing in U.S. waters; (d) discourage tourist travel to the USSR; (e) suspend Aeroflot service to the U.S. and end Soviet maritime access to U.S. ports; (f) suspend negotiations on economic matters; (g) pressure U.S. banks to curtail credits.

Pros: -- Would be strong signal of end to business-as-usual.

-- Curtailing our major agricultural as well as industrial trade is a prerequisite to getting Europeans to impose across-the-board trade restrictions of their own.

-- Would cause immediate short-term economic dislocations for Soviets.

Cons: -- Economic impact would be severely diluted without Allied imposition of corresponding measures.

-- Economic warfare could cause Soviets and Poles to repudiate over \$40 billion in debts to the West.

-- Allies highly unlikely to go along except in case of all-out Soviet intervention; even then, measures not likely to remain in effect for very long.

-- Allies will resist specific aspects of trade embargo, e.g. export of oil/gas extraction technologies, given divergence of view on desirability of assisting Soviet energy sector.

-- Domestic economic interests will resist, particularly if embargo not supported by Allies.

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- Would require spending \$3-5 billion to support grain prices.

4. Seek to isolate the USSR politically: (a) sharply reduce levels of diplomatic representation in Moscow and Washington; (b) seek condemnation of USSR in international organizations, e.g. UN, ILO, CSCE; (c) cancel all remaining cultural, scientific, and academic exchange agreements, and discourage private exchanges; (d) escalate radio broadcasting/anti-jamming efforts directed toward the Soviet audience (consider direct-broadcast satellites); (e) request Ambassador Dobrynin's recall, withdraw Ambassador Hartman.

Pros: -- Would be dramatic political slap-in-face for Soviets, symbolizing end to business-as-usual.

- Conveys high and lasting cost of Soviet-sponsored repression in Poland.

Cons: -- Allies would criticize reduction in US-Soviet dialogue at time of crisis.

- Could remove disincentives to massive Soviet intervention in Poland.
- Could precipitate greater Soviet risk-taking in third world.

5. Propose a large-scale international assistance program for Poland (a new Marshall Plan).

Pros: -- Would put U.S. on propaganda high ground.

- Could provide inducement for bringing about end to martial law.
- If implemented, would increase Western influence over Poland at Soviets' expense.

Cons: -- Difficult to keep program from becoming bail-out of Polish economy, relieving Soviets of their share of the burden.

- Would require huge USG budgetary outlays; international financial backing also doubtful.
- Soviets likely to veto Polish acceptance.

B. Special Cases:

1a. Postpone or cancel the January 26-28 Haig/Gromyko meetings (variant: inform Soviets that U.S. agreement to meetings is "under review") in light of Polish developments.

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Pros: -- Will indicate to Soviets that cooperative side of relationship is in jeopardy.

-- "Under review" formula would leave us option to go ahead with meetings if Polish situation improved.

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-- Haig/Gromyko would be useful forum to register our concerns about Poland at Politburo level.

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Pros: -- Would provide early forum to drive home to Soviet leadership the consequences of their actions in Poland.

-- Would be applauded by Allies as appropriate enhancement of East-West dialogue in crisis period.

Cons: -- Soviets would likely demand Moscow as venue, which would cast us in role of supplicant.

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Pros: -- Denies Soviets high-priority arms control forum.

-- Casts Soviets as responsible for breakdown in INF process.

Cons: -- Allies likely to object absent overt Soviet involvement in Poland, particularly if U.S. move rekindles peace movement.

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Pros: -- Would deny Soviets their much-sought resumption of the SALT process.

Cons: -- Soviets could react by ending their informal observance of the SALT II limits.

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-- Could raise objections on the part of the Allies.

-- Later initiation of START could entwine talks in 1984 electoral politics.

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Pros: -- Would dramatize Soviets' flagrant violation of CSCE principles in their dealings with Poland, as well as on human rights.

-- Would signal that we do not accept the Soviet view that the post-war division of Europe gives them special rights to intervene in Eastern Europe.

Cons: -- This idea was proposed by President Carter after Afghanistan, and then dropped. As then, the Allies are likely to oppose on principle, and to object strongly to U.S. unilateral action without consultation.

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5. Pull out of the MBFR Negotiations

Pros: -- Would emphasize how Soviet actions in Poland make a mockery of the notion of force reductions and confidence-building measures in central Europe.

-- Little cost, since talks stalemated anyway.

Cons: -- Allies, especially Germans, may resist.

-- If done unilaterally, would create strains in Alliance about failure to consult.

III. Actions we would want to take in concert with the Allies .

The Allies have expressed outrage over events in Poland individually, as well as through NATO and the EC-10, but with nuances. Like the US, France has been tough on the Soviets. Others -- the FRG, Canada, Scandinavians,, and the Benelux among them -- have held off direct criticism of the USSR, focusing instead on repression within Poland, although the Allies may be increasingly willing to follow our lead on a robust line toward the Soviets. Italy and the FRG are both reluctant to use major sanctions now on the Soviets, arguing that we should save such ammunition for later, and many others would likely agree. France, toughly anti-Soviet, is consistently reluctant to join in sanctions that hurt French economic interests and often plays a blocking role on COCOM consensus.

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On balance, we can expect fair to good support on symbolic and political measures, including tough ones like warning the Soviets on CSCE or INF. But, if we push now for economic measures with teeth, we will face strong resistance and the argument that we are prematurely using up our deterrence.

Possible Allied measures, apart from the NATO-agreed "menu," include:

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Cons: -- Since CSCE procedures require consensus, results of the meeting are likely to be minimal.

3. Measures parallel to U.S. steps to isolate Soviets politically (see item 4 on page 3, above):

Pros: -- Would reinforce political message if Allies joined with us

Cons: -- Across-the-board reduction in East-West contacts will meet stiff Allied resistance.

IV. Assessment

Poland obviously represents a vital interest for the USSR, and the Soviets will intervene no matter what actions we take if they perceive a clear threat to Poland's status as a member of the Warsaw Pact, or a fundamental change in Poland's political orientation. Drastic actions on our part, in addition to being ineffective, seem certain to strain the Alliance to the breaking point, and to preclude or make it immensely difficult for us to capitalize on the Polish

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Against this somber backdrop, the modalities of applying bold measures against the Soviets become vitally important. Rash actions would undoubtedly divide NATO and prematurely deplete our ammunition; even more moderate actions taken late could make us look foolish and ineffective, even if they have a long-term punitive effect.

On timing, we should apply bold measures only when we see a high probability of irreversible Soviet actions that would throw Poland back to its pre-August, 1980 status. Apart from Soviet military intervention, this could involve such actions within Poland as the trial and imprisonment of Walesa, or widespread and prolonged use of brutality in suppressing human freedoms.

The method of application could be fine-tuned as follows: we would first make clear threats, which convey to Moscow exactly what we expect of the Soviets, and when, and specify what will follow from us if the Soviets refuse to go along. This should be done in diplomatic channels, both in Washington and in Moscow. We could also divide our major actions into two categories: those that do not destroy the core of the relationship, and those that directly affect the core, e.g., INF, START, CSCE Final Act. We would use first category actions in an initial salvo, reserving the second for follow-up action as subsequent events make necessary.

If we wish to pursue a course of this severity, we must be prepared to carry through our threats effectively. The worst possible outcome would be robust words followed by flabby actions. We should immediately commence intensive preparations within the Administration, as well as intensive consultations with our Allies and friends abroad.

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